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1. Introduction 
Brigham and Daves (2004) argue that 1.5 % of assets are held as cash on average by 
industrial firms. Lee and Song empirically found that after the Asian Financial crises the 
firms in Asia have increased their cash holdings and showed less attraction towards 
leverage. However whether this level of cash holdings is optimal for the firms is an 
important question to be addressed. Why these firms opt for huge cash holdings when cash 
in itself is a non interest generating asset. Furthermore there is a lack of research on this 
issue in emerging markets as very few studies have been conducted to address this question 
of why firms hold huge amount of cash in emerging markets. As far as China is concerned 
its market are unique in its financing alternatives and ownership structure. 
 
Being the world second largest economy China makes a unique setting to study the 
corporate cash holdings. China has less sophisticated capital markets as compared to other 
developed nations of the world and the major financing alternatives are bank loans. 
Moreover the situation becomes more complex while considering the fact of SOEs and 
NSOEs. Guo et al (2013) reported that by end of September 2006, largest shareholders who 
held 56% of shares were state shares controlled by Chinese government and other state asset 
management companies. Until 1998, the largest Chinese banks (most of them were state 
owned) were advised not to give credit to Chinese private companies. It was because of low 
political stature of these companies. Since 1998, these impediments in financing due to 
political pecking order should have been alleviated. However research evidence suggest that 
financing constraints for private Chinese companies are still there due to social and political 
factors(Huang 2003).Numerous research studies indicate that financial constraints are 
impediments to investment, growth and survival of the company(Stein 2003,Hubbard 1998). 
This implies that Chinese firms (especially private firms) have fewer alternatives of debt 
financing. This makes this study more important from the point of view that private firms 
have fewer alternatives to raise external capital, so naturally these firms will tend to hold 
excess cash but to which degree will imply to be the optimal cash holdings for Chinese 
firms. Ownership concentration is another unique feature of Chinese firms. Chinese 
companies are highly concentrated in term of ownership concentration. A single largest 
owner holds about 36% of an average company share, while 52% shares are held by five 
biggest owners (Guo et al 2013). This higher ownership concentration will affect the 
decision making process regarding Chinese firms. Thus due to investment attractiveness and 
possible conflicts in decision making process makes this study very important to study the 
behavior of Chinese firms with respect to their financial decision making. 
 
The study uses a rich data set of 1632 firms divided into state-owned and non-state owned 
firms. The data covers a period from 2001 to 2013. The rest of the study is organized as 
follows. Section 1 provides review of published literature, followed by discussion on various 
determinants of corporate cash holdings and their related hypothesis. Section three provides 
research methodology, followed by discussion of results and conclusion. 
 
2. Review of Prior Studies 
Theoretically speaking firms hold cash due to several motives. Keynes (1936) argued that 
three motives drive the demand for money. These motives are transactionary, precautionary 
and speculative motives. Convenience and confidence is provided by first two motives while 
motive of speculations provide money yield. Cash is held by corporations to meet day to day 
demand and to manage operations. Thus demand for cash is raised due to the difference in 
cash inflow and cash outflow. This motive for cash is termed as transactionary motive. 
Money is also held as a safety margin for some unforeseen events and future uncertainties. 
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In speculative motive money is held by the corporations for earning profit. However holding 
excess cash has its costs. This cost is the opportunity cost. Holding excess cash may leads to 
agency conflicts between firm’s management and shareholders (Jensen, 1986).  Moreover 
Bates et al. (2009) and Foley et al. (2007) argue that cash is held for tax purposes. 
Thus to measure the optimal cash balance, a firm must make a tradeoff between holding 
excess level of cash and the associated costs. Excess cash has numerous alternatives for 
investment. It can be invested in short term marketable securities, however they may 
provide liquidity to firms but they report very low after tax returns. Concentrating on the 
determinant factors of holding cash managers can be able to make necessary adjustments 
about the level of cash to attain an optimal cash level. 
 
Different studies which analyzed cash holdings and its determinants with reference to target 
level of cash holdings are consistent with studies on leverage (Jani et al., 2004). Frictionless 
capital market assumption makes holding cash by firms irrelevant. But this assumption can 
be relaxed owing to modern trends in cash holdings (Drobetz et al., 2010). By considering 
transaction costs, agency problems and information asymmetry, the debate on corporate 
cash holdings features trade off theory and pecking order theory by Meyars(1984) and free 
cash flow hypothesis by Jensen (1986) very prominently.   
 
2.1.Firm Characteristics 
This study follows Opler et al. (1999). They reported various cash holdings’ determinants in 
US firms. Following section provides a debate on the relationship of various determinants 
with cash holdings. 
 
2.1.1. Growth Opportunities 
It is very difficult to value even the projects with positive NPV since these projects are not 
yet realized and there is a factor of intangibility involved (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Thus 
valuing such firms is a difficult task because their value will depend upon the realization of 
these opportunities (D’Mello et al., 2008). Pecking order theory suggests that firms with  
higher growth opportunities need higher cash level to cope with any shortfall in cash. 
Furthermore tradeoff theory predicts that a firm will need higher level of cash to avoid 
financial distress in time of better growth opportunities. Thus to avoid any shortfall in cash 
is in accordance with tranasctionary motives of cash (Opler et al., 1999). Second motive of 
avoiding financial distress is consistent with motive of precaution (Bates et al., 2009). But 
inverse relationship of growth opportunities with corporate cash holdings is reported in 
numerous studies (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Jani et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2009), which 
corresponds to agency theory. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) reason that firms characterized by 
low growth opportunities may invest even in projects having negative net present value. 
Entrenched management and poor growth prospects compel firms to hoard more cash for 
use; but during funds’ raising these firms will tend to conceal detailed information from 
investors, disclosure of which is mandatory by regulatory authorities (Jani et al., 2004; Bates 
et al., 2009).this isin line with agency theory because in such cases cash is accumulated due 
to agency problems (Bates et al. 2009). 
 
Thus relationship of growth opportunities with corporate cash holding is unclear. This study 
follows Hill et al. (2010) in measurement of growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are 
measured by market to book ratio which is obtained by dividing the book value of total 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, on book value of 
assets. 
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Alternative Hypothesis (H1a): Growth Opportunities significantly affects corporate cash 
holdings of a firm.  
 
 
2.1.2. Firm Size 
According to Titman and Wessels (1988) economies of scale which can be achieved through 
corporate cash management makes smaller firms to be more financially distressed. 
Moreover, smaller firms are characterized with information asymmetry (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004). This makes rising of external funds more costly for these firms (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). Bigger firms have the privilege of better credit rating, thus they have bank credit line 
(opler et al. 1999). These two facts greatly help larger firms to obtain external financing 
with ease. Thus larger firms can obtain large amount of capital, and they are better 
positioned to reap the benefits of economies of scale (D’Mello et al., 2008). Therefore 
tradeoff theory predicts that size has an inverse relationship with corporate cash holdings. 
This motive of holding cash corresponds to transaction motive (Bates et al., 2009). However 
due to positive effects of size on profit, bigger sized firms are expected to be more 
successful. Hence, these firms will tend to accumulate more cash than smaller firms after 
controlling for their investment (Opler et al., 1999, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Jani et al., 
2004). This shows that in contrast to our previous debate pecking order theory predicts a 
direct relationship of size with corporate cash holdings. Furthermore larger firms have high 
dispersion of ownership which reduces the chances of takeovers thus giving managers 
discretion in their financial decision making (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Thus a direct 
relationship of with corporate cash holdings is predicted by agency theory.  
 
Based on the prediction of these three theories size can affect corporate cash holding either 
in positive or negative way. Natural log of firm’s total assets is used to measure firm’s size. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H2a): Size has a significant effect on corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.1.3.  Cash flow 
Cash flow is a liquidity source and it reduces excess cash holdings needs (Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004). Thus trade off theory predicts that cash flow negatively affects cash holdings. 
But   Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue higher cash flow’s firms will reserve most of it as 
cash. Thus according to pecking order theory cash flow is expected to positively affect 
corporate cash holdings.  Deloof (2003) argues that cash flow is a readily available source of 
cash and firms which utilize their liquid reserves to finance their projects will tend to 
accumulate more cash from their free cash flows. This is further confirmed by Garcia-Teruel 
and Martinez-Solano (2008) who highlight that firms with larger cash flows are expected to 
have higher cash levels. .This is according to the financing motive of cash holdings. 
However cash can also be held from cash flows as a precaution to finance operation in time 
of less liquidity (Deloof, 2003). 
 
Thus these two theories give contrasting arguments about the relationship between corporate 
cash holdings and cash flow. This implies an ambiguous relationship of cash flow with cash 
holdings. This study follows Hill et al. (2010) in measuring the cash flow. Cash flow is 
EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus, interest expense, tax charges and any 
common dividend paid. For purpose of scaling this value is then divided by total assets. 
Alternative Hypothesis (H3a):  Cash flows significantly affects corporate cash holdings 
 
2.1.4. Leverage 
Financial distress and bankruptcy are two important attributes associated with leverage. 
Chances of bankruptcy are higher when debt level increases.  Deloof (2003) argues that 
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firms having high leverage need to accumulate excess cash to cope with bankruptcy. This 
reduced possibility of bankruptcy is in accordance with precautionary motive of firm for 
holding more cash. Thus leverage is going to positively influence corporate cash holding, 
which is in accordance with trade off theory. However, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and 
D’Mello et al. (2008) argue that leverage is a proxy for firm’s ability to raise more debt. 
Thus highly levered firms are expected to hoard less cash. This accounts that corporate cash 
holding is negatively affected by leverage. According to pecking order theory and 
arguments put forward by Opler et al. (1999) and Jani et al. (2004), debt is issued in 
situations when a firm has used up all of the retained earnings. Thus cash level of a firm 
usually falls if its investment needs are higher than its retained earnings and vice versa. One 
important fact in this regard is that firm’s high leverage can be used as a proxy for its access 
to the debt market (John, 1993). In the context of agency theory according to Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) managers tend to hold more cash because cash is safer than debt. Furthermore 
Jensen (1986) argues that entrenched management is happy to hold more cash in time of 
poor investment opportunities rather than to distribute it to shareholders as dividends. 
Higher level of cash may be used by for personal benefits even they might invest in projects 
having negative NPV, because these projects are immune from scrutiny by financial market 
participants. 
 
Thus based upon above discussion of these three theories, leverage can affect corporate cash 
holdings in both positive as well as negative way. This study follows Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) in measuring leverage. Leverage is measured by dividing firm’s long term debt 
which also includes firm’s short term borrowing on firm’s long-term debt plus market 
capitalization. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H4a): Leverage and corporate cash holdings have a significant 
relationship.  
 
2.1.5. Net working capital 
In the context of liquidity, networking capital acts as a substitute for firm’s liquidity.  
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and D’Mello et al (2008), argue that according to  tradeoff theory 
firms having high NWC will hoard  less cash because  NWC in itself a source of liquidity 
and can be liquidated when a need arises for the firm. This corresponds to transaction 
motive of firm for holding higher cash level. Thus tradeoff theory predicts that networking 
capital is expected to negatively affect cash holdings. But there is also possibility that this 
relationship is positive. One important attribute in this regard is firm cash conversion cycle. 
Firm having shorter CCC will have higher liquidity and thus they will need to hold less cash 
for precautionary motives. Jani et al. (2004) are more pragmatic in arguing that shorter CCC 
frees up cash and thus automatically increase firm’s cash holdings. 
 
Thus how NWC  affects cash holdings is ambiguous as discussed above. NWC is measured 
by subtracting accounts payable from the sum of accounts receivables and inventory. The 
value is then scaled by total assets. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H5a): Firms liquidity significantly affects corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.1.6. Capital expenditure 
 Firms hold more cash if they have higher need of capital expenditure (Opler et al. 1999). In 
the context of static trade off theory this relationship holds because a firm having higher 
cash level or having more liquid assets will be better positioned in fulfilling its need of 
capital expenditure.  Bates et al. (2009) report same relationship and argue that capital 
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expenditure is a proxy for financial distress cost, thus suggesting that capital expenditure is 
going to positively affect cash holdings. Two important costs associated with raising capital 
are the transaction cost and opportunity cost. Jani et al. (2004) argue that these two costs are 
associated with firms having less cash or liquid assets, thus firms will hold more cash rather 
than raising external capital. On the other hand Opler et al. (1999) put forward their 
arguments based on pecking order theory that  firms will use up cash if they have high 
capital expenditure need and as a result they will report low cash levels. These firms 
accumulate less cash with few internal resources (Jani et al., 2004). Thus a negative 
relationship is predicted by pecking order theory. Furthermore Bates et al. (2009) argue that 
firms may use capital expenditure to create assets for collateral use for raising debt. This 
will give an opportunity of raising more debt to managers and firm will have increased debt 
capacity which will in turn decrease demand for cash. They further quote Riddick and 
Whited (2009) that an abrupt increase in demand may induce increase productivity which 
will increase capital expenditure in short run. So an increase in short term investment is 
expected which will in turn decrease the ability of firm to hold more cash. 
 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that CAPEX hold either positive or negative 
relationship with corporate cash holdings. CAPEX is measured as change in value of 
tangible fixed assets from time t-1 to time t (Ross et al., 2008). Depreciation is added to this 
value and then divided by total assets for scaling purpose. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H6a): Corporate cash holdings can be affected both positively as 
well as negatively by capital expenditure. 
 
2.1.7. Board Characteristics 
To safeguard the interests of minority shareholders is the responsibility of board of directors 
through effective management and monitoring mechanism as argued by (Kusnadi, 2007). As 
for as board characteristics are concerned two important attributes considered by various 
studies in the effectiveness of board are board’s size and board’s independence. Studies 
conducted in emerging markets like Malaysia have reported the ineffectiveness of board 
characteristics such as board independence in overall improvement on corporate governance 
to ensure that minority shareholders’ rights are protected. Important studies conducted in 
this regard include Wan-Hussin (2009).Because of the reasons discussed this study has 
included board size and board independence to study in what manner board is effective with 
regard to corporate decision making of corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.1.8. Board Size 
Managers who are effectively monitored by board have a tendency of not investing in 
projects having negative net present value. This reduces the accumulation of cash in these 
firms. However Lee and Lee (2009) argue that larger boards are prone to get involved in 
lengthy and inefficient decision making process. As a consequence of this beaurocratic 
nature of the decision making process these boards loses control on their managers who in 
turn give the managers an opportunity to hold more cash. This corresponds to a positive 
relationship between board size and corporate cash holdings. This study measures board size 
simply by taking the overall number of directors on the board. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H7a): Board size positively affects corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.1.9. Board Independence 
Researchers agree to the fact that by increasing board independence results in an effective 
monitoring and oversight on managers. But the studies conducted on the role of board 
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independence have largely been ineffective. Weisbach (1988) argue that board 
independence enhance independent decision making and hence independent boards are able 
to replace ineffective and inefficient managers to improve firm’s performance. This shows 
that board independence reduces managerial opportunism and consequently higher level of 
board independence ensures lower corporate cash holdings. However Bhagat and Black 
(2002) reports ineffectiveness of board independence in monitoring the management of a 
firm. Romano (2005) clearly highlights this discrepancy by arguing that hiring process of 
independent directors may be ambiguous. There is a possibility that independent directors 
are hired by managers just to fulfill the regulatory requirements. Moreover the theory of 
managerial hegemony argues that there is a shift in firm’s control from shareholders to 
managers and directors are just a “rubber stamp” for managerial decisions making (Mace, 
1971; Vance, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Cornforth, 2002). Thus there exists the 
possibility that despite of presence of an independent board managers still have the privilege 
of managerial opportunism resulting in higher level of cash holdings. 
 
Based on the above discussion it can be concluded that board independence can affect firm’s 
cash holding in either way, i.e. positive or negative. Board independence is measured simply 
by taking the number of independent directors on the board. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H8a): There is a significant relationship between corporate cash 
holdings and board in dependence of a firm. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1.Data and Data Source 
 
The study uses a rich data set of 1634 A listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange extended over a 13 years period from 2001 to 2013. Data ranges from code 
C00002 to C600918 mainly collected from RESET database. Firms having minimum 6 
years of data are included in analysis in order to avoid survivorship biases posed due to 
elimination of firms with missing data.  
 
3.2.Model Specification 
We follow the static model of Opler et al. (1999) to analyze the relationship between 
identified variables and corporate cash holdings. The model in modified form is given as 
follows. 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
 
In equation (1)  
itCASH   is the sum of cash and marketable securities of firm i at time t scaled by total  
assets. 
itMTB   is the ration of market value and book value of firm i at time t. 
itSIZE2  is the natural log of total assets of firm i at time t scaled by total assets. 
 
itOCF   is cash flow from operation of firm i at time t scaled by total assets. 
itititit
itititititit
eBINDBSIZECAPEX
NWCLEVOCFSIZEMTBCASH


876
543210


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itLEV   is the market leverage of firm i at time t. 
itCAPEX  is the capital expenditure of firm i at time t scaled by total assets. 
itBSIZE  is the total number of directors of firm i at time t. 
itBIND  is the total number of independent directors of firm i at time t. 
ite   is the error term. 
However two important issue related to model (1) is the engoneity between leverage and 
corporate cash reserves (D’Mello et al., 2008) and adjustment made by firms to achieve a 
target level of cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Endogeneity can be addressed by 
applying valid instruments for leverage prediction. But the adjustment of firms for target 
level cash cannot be immediately achieved due to the associated adjustment costs. This 
implies to following relationship between current cash holdings and cash holdings at time t-
1. 
 
)( 11   itititit CASHCASHCASHCASH          (2) 
    
    In equation (2), ( 1 itit CASHCASH ) represents adjustment needed to achieve a target 
cash level  is the adjustment speed of a firm to achieve target level of cash. Thus the term 
  takes value from 0 to 1.If  =0, it means itCASH = 1tCASH . This implies that the firm 
wants to remain with the same level of cash due to high cost of adjustment to achieve a 
target level of corporate cash holdings. However if  =1 then itCASH =
*
itCASH . This infers 
that in such a case a firm will opt to achieve its target level of cash immediately. 
By putting equation (1), in equation (2) we get 
 
ittiititit
itititititit
eBINDBSIZECAPEXNWC
LEVOCFSIZEMTBCASHCASH



 
8765
432110 )1(
    (3) 
 
In the above equation i  correspond to firm specific effects and t  are the time specific 
effects.  
Equation (3) can be rewritten in simplified form as follow. 
 
ittiititit
ititititititit
BINDBSIZECAPEX
NWCLEVOCFSIZEMTBCASHCASH



 
876
543211
    (4) 
 
In equation (4)  ;);1(;0 kk    and  ititt e   
 
 
Due to the problem of endgoeneity between leverage and cash holdings and firm’s 
adjustment to achieve the target level of cash, using OLS to estimate equation (4) will be 
inconsistent. In order to address these issues this study applies two steps Generalized 
Method of Moments( GMM) estimator to estimate equation(4).Two-step GMM  is selected 
since in term of efficiency it is better than One-step GMM. 
 
4. Findings and Analysis 
The study uses regression analysis as a statistical tool for estimating the models. Ordinary 
Least Square regression and random effects regression with AR (2) term is used to estimate 
the models. AR (2) is used to account for possible serial correlation. Finally GMM is used to 
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account for problem of endogeneity between leverage and cash and firm’s adjustment to 
achieve a target level of cash. 
The descriptive statistics are given in table 1 for overall firms, SOEs and NSOEs, 
represented with their number of observation, mean and standard deviation. 
 
The descriptive statistics reveals that mean value of cash for overall firms at time t is 
0.666692, which is equal to about 6.6 % of Chines Yuan given that one Chinese Yuan is 
equal to 10 units. This value is much lower as compared to studies conducted in developed 
nations like US by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Drobetz et al. (2010).  Furthermore 
mean value for cash for NSOEs is greater than SOEs. This shows that NSOEs tend to hold 
more cash given that prevalent loans in the market are directed towards SOEs. This 
corresponds to pecking order of loans towards SOEs by the creditors (Huang 2003). 
Descriptive statistics shows different value of mean of cash for individual sectors. To find 
out whether this difference in means is statistically significant the study follows 
Wasiuzzaman  and Arumugam (2013) and conduct a Non Parametric Kruskal–Wallis Test 
(Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
The Kruskal–Wallis test statistic shows statistical significance of mean difference between 
SOEs and NSOEs. The p value for the test is 0.000 which shows statistical significance at 
99% level. The highest rank is shown for State owned Enterprises. This concludes that 
corporate cash holdings for NSOEs are higher than SOEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics                      
      Overall        NSOE        SOE    
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean      Std. Dev. 
LEV  21944  0.224374  0.150911 9566 0.232431 0.153625  12378  0.218148 0.148486
MTB  24987  2.518086  2.490207 10350 3.092211 2.546376  14637  2.112116 2.367193
CASH  25318  0.666692  0.443969 10797 0.1934 0.383511  14926  0.192015 0.4724
CAPEX  25723  0.023783  0.047603 10797 0.023169 0.045986  14926  0.024226 0.048735
NWC  25700  0.18314  0.170456 10793 0.186752 0.164075  14907  0.180525 0.17489
BSIZE  21695  11.27615  4.550996 10226 11.44211 4.43668  11469  11.12817 4.645748
BIND  19707  3.698787  1.505934 9754 3.712528 1.513192  9953  3.685321 1.498741
SIZE  25720  20.88725  1.715709 10796 21.14644 1.300129  14924  20.69975 1.940804
OCF  25318  0.666692  0.443969 10640 0.645874 0.426481  14678  0.681782 0.455647
Table Key 
LEV  Leverage 
MTB  Market to book ratio 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
NWC  Networking Capital 
BSIZE  Board Size 
BIND  Board Independence 
OCF 
Cash 
flow 
Obs  Observations 
SOE  state owned Enterprises 
NSOE  Non state Owned Enterprises 
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Table 2:   Non parametric Kruskal–Wallis Test Results          
Sector Observations 
No of 
Firms 
%of 
Firms 
Rank 
Sum 
Mean 
Cash 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Test   
SOE  10797  702 43% 1.41E+08 0.1920 chi‐squared  14.286***
NSOE  14926  932 53% 1.90E+08 0.1943      
*** shows significance at 99% 
 
The correlation matrix corresponding to all variables with their respective VIF (Variance 
Inflation Factor) is given in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Correlation 
Analysis                            
Variables  MTB  CASH  CAPEX  NWC LEV CF SIZE BIND BSIZE  CASH(L1)  VIF*
MTB  1  1.04 
CASH  0.06  1 
            
_ 
CAPEX  ‐0.05  ‐0.18  1  1.07 
NWC  0.03  ‐0.07  ‐0.31  1 1.21
LEV  ‐0.06  ‐0.37  0.11  ‐0.04  1  1.16 
OCF  ‐0.05  0.07  0.12  ‐0.07  ‐0.15  1  1.06 
SIZE  ‐0.16  ‐0.11  0.05  ‐0.07  0.08  0.08  1  1.11 
BIND  0.01  ‐0.09  0.04  ‐0.03 0.03 0.03 0.24 1 1.56
BSIZE  0.05  ‐0.16  0.04  ‐0.05  0.12  ‐0.03  0.15  0.57  1  1.54 
CASH(L1)  0.01  0.662  ‐0.18  ‐0.02  ‐0.31  0.08  ‐0.09  ‐0.07  ‐0.13  1  1.16 
*VIF is the Variance Inflation 
Factor 
 
Two important features of this table are correlation coefficients and VIF (variance inflation 
factor) of different variables. From the table 3 it can be concluded that there is no issue of 
multicolinearty. All the correlation coefficient are much lower except for lagged cash value 
CASH (L1)) where it is 0.662 and board size (BSIZE) which is 0.576. But the VIF values 
are in acceptable ranges since VIF corresponds to severity of multicolinearity. 
 
After having no strong case for multicolinearity the study conducted pooled regression 
analysis to show the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Table 4 
reports results for overall firms and the theories supported by these results. Table 5 and 6 
report results for state-owned and non-state owned enterprises. Results for static model of 
equation 1 are obtained by using OLS and random effects with an added AR term to cope 
with the problem of serial correlation. The results for the dynamic model of equation 4 are 
obtained by running Generalized Method of Moments Regression (GMM). Column one of 
table 4, 5 and 6 represents the GLS regression with an added AR term. Column 2 represents 
the GMM regression while Column 3 represents the OLS regression results.  
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4.1.Discussion of Results 
The discussion focuses on columns 1 and 2 of tables 4, 5, 6 
The results indicate a positive and statistically significant lagged cash (dependent) variable. 
From this it can be inferred that firms pursue a target amount of cash holdings after making 
a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of holding more cash. 
The dynamic GMM estimator in column 2 shows that adjustment coefficient   for overall 
firms is 0.45. It means firms in China takes approximately 4.5 years to adjust to their target 
level of cash. 
This adjustment speed is relatively less as compared adjustment speed found by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) for UK’s firms (0.605), Guney et al. (2003) for French firms and Japanese 
(0.561) firms. The adjustment coefficient for State owned enterprises (0.47) is higher than 
non-state-owned enterprises. 
Apart from adjustment speed the effect of other firm specific characteristics on corporate 
cash holdings is also tested. The results for overall firms show that networking capital 
(NWC), capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and leverage (LEV) have negative and statistically 
significant relationship. 
Adjustment coefficient for state owned enterprises is 0.42 (table 5) while for non state 
owned enterprises its 0.47 (Table 6) This means state-owned enterprises in China takes 
relatively more time to adjust to their target cash levels. 
These results are consistent with pecking order theory and findings of Opler et al. (1999), 
Jani et al. (2004) and Bates et al. (2009).  
Debt financing is only considered when retained earnings are exhausted and vice versa. This 
follows that corporate cash holdings actually fall when investment need is higher than 
retained earnings and cash holding level rises when investment need is less than retained 
earnings. 
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Table4: Regression Output (Overall Firms)   
  
Predicted 
Sign   GLS (AR1)     GMM     OLS    
             Coef.  Coef.  Coef.
Theory 
Supported 
MTB  (+/‐)  0.0034***  0.00291***  0.0022***  POT/TOT 
(0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
CAPEX  (+/‐)  ‐0.490***  ‐0.6915  ‐0.322***  POT 
(0.0391) (0.1216) (0.0352) 
NWC  (+/‐) ‐0.211*** ‐0.0807*** ‐0.125**  TOT 
(0.0078)  (0.01453)  (0.0058) 
LEV  (+/‐)  ‐0.243***  ‐0.154***  ‐0.146***  POT/TOT/FCF 
(0.0074)  (0.0178)  (0.0054) 
BIND  (+/‐) 0.0013* ‐0.00029 0.0003 FCF 
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) 
BSIZE  +  ‐0.002***  0.0013*  ‐0.0018**  FCF 
(0.0003)  (0.0005)  (0.0002) 
SIZE  (+/‐)  ‐0.004***  ‐0.0142**  ‐0.003***  POT 
(0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0006) 
OCF  (+/‐) ‐0.030*** ‐0.056*** 0.0033*  POT 
(0.0030)  (0.0104)  (0.0018) 
CASH(L1)  0.047***  0.5564**  0.589***  POT/TOT 
(0.0069) (0.0139) (0.0062) 
_cons   0.4201*** 0.638*** 0.1832*** 
Wald chi2  2545***  546.89*** 
Durbin‐
Watson  1.3747 
Baltagi‐Wu 
LBI  1.8600 
Breusch and 
Pagan  190.8900
 Adj R‐
squared  0.4774 
                    
standard errors are in 
parenthesis 
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90%  respectively
TOT  Trade off Theory
POT  Pecking Order Theory
FCF  Free Cash flow Theory                
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Table5: Regression Output (State Owned Enterprises)    
    GLS (AR1)      GMM      OLS 
         Coef.         Coef.     Coef. 
MTB  0.0042***  0.022***  0.0036*** 
(0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005) 
CAPEX  ‐0.232***  ‐0.0353  ‐0.287*** 
(0.0417)  (0.1422)  (0.0419) 
NWC  ‐0.183***  ‐0.254***  ‐0.048*** 
(0.0112)  (0.0216)  (0.0067) 
LEV  ‐0.265***  ‐0.104***  ‐0.159*** 
(0.0103)  (0.0184)  (0.0075) 
BIND  0.002*  ‐0.0002  0.0015* 
(0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0008) 
BSIZE  ‐0.002***  0.0001  ‐0.002*** 
(0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
SIZE  ‐0.0087***  0.015***  ‐0.004*** 
(0.0016)  (0.0035)  (0.0009) 
CF  ‐0.033***  ‐0.026**  ‐0.0033 
(0.0041)  (0.0077)  (0.0024) 
CASH(L1)  0.061***  0.53***  0.573*** 
(0.0097)  (0.0123)  (0.0089) 
_cons   0.500***  ‐0.195***  0.2382*** 
Wald chi2  1367.28*** 665.26** 
Durbin‐Watson       1.335 
Baltagi‐Wu LBI       1.83 
Breusch and Pagan      120.9*** 
 Adj R‐squared  0.4741 
            
standard errors are in parenthesis 
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90%  respectively 
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Table6: Regression Output (Non‐state Owned Enterprises)    
            GLS (AR1)       GMM          OLS 
                   Coef.         Coef.          Coef. 
MTB  0.0027***  0.0028***  0.0014** 
(0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005) 
CAPEX  ‐2.008***  ‐0.327**  ‐1.1560 
(0.1034)  (0.1517)  (0.0757) 
NWC  ‐0.249***  ‐0.300***  ‐0.117*** 
(0.0108)  (0.0253)  (0.0070) 
LEV  ‐0.217***  ‐0.081**  ‐0.134*** 
(0.0106)  (0.0203)  (0.0076) 
BIND  0.0006  0.0002  0.0005 
(0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0009) 
BSIZE  ‐0.0019***  0.0006  ‐0.002*** 
(0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0003) 
SIZE  ‐0.0014  0.0261***  ‐0.0022** 
(0.0017)  (0.0042)  (0.0009) 
OCF  ‐0.0150***  ‐0.0500  0.010*** 
(0.0042)  (0.0095)  (0.0026) 
CASH(L1)  0.0583***  0.584***  0.574*** 
(0.0100)  (0.0146)  (0.0089) 
_cons   0.3735***  ‐0.407***  0.206*** 
Wald chi2  1536.8***  565.63*** 
Durbin‐Watson  1.4200         ‐ 
Baltagi‐Wu LBI  1.9010         ‐  
Breusch and Pagan  93.56*** 
 Adj R‐squared  0.5141 
            
standard errors are in parenthesis 
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at 99%,95%, and 90%  respectively 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This is study is unique from the point of view that it not only adjustment speed of but also 
investigate various determinants of cash holdings in Chinese firms with special reference to 
Chinese SOEs and NSOEs. An extensive set of panel data comprising 1634 A listed Chinese 
firms, over a period from 2001 to 2013 is taken for analysis. The adjustment coefficient for 
Chinese firms is relatively low compared to studies conducted in developed countries. 
Furthermore adjustment speed is relatively lower for NSOEs than SOEs. 
 
The study also finds firm’s characteristics that influence corporate cash holdings. Growth 
opportunities are found to influence cash positively because of associated information 
asymmetry of investment opportunities. Networking capital, leverage and capital 
expenditure show a negative relationship with corporate cash holdings corresponding to 
pecking order theory. An ambiguous relationship for board independence is found while 
board characteristics show a negative significant relationship which indicates the 
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effectiveness of board size in Chinese firms. Operating cash flow shows a negative 
relationship in consistency with pecking order theory because Chinese firms take the cash 
flow as readily available source of financing, thus avoiding costly external financing. Size 
negatively affects corporate cash holdings indicating that bigger sized firm have better 
alternative of financing due to their market reputation. 
 
The study has its limitations. It may have added other board characteristics such as CEO 
duality and ownership concentration to show their effect on cash holdings. However study 
tries to address the issue of endogeneity by using two steps GMM. 
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